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Speaking for Others
Lauren Marino
Speaker location is a recent yet important
discussion in the philosophy of language. It was
suggested by Linda Alcoff in her article “The Problem
of Speaking for Others” that a speaker’s location affects
not only the meaning but also the truth of what is said.1
With this in mind, there are two problems with
speaking for other people that need to be resolved. The
first is the relation of language to the self, and the
access we have to the experience of others. The second
is the political dimension that determines the effective
and appropriate situations for speaking for others. I
will argue that the self is constituted through language
games and as such, when we speak for others we must
be careful not to remove agency from the other, and
force upon them our definition of who they are. I will
argue that bell hooks’ argument for the oppressed to
create new language games through organic
intellectuals is the best struggle in which the oppressed
can engage.
To determine the relationship between language
and the self is to determine how language gains
meaning. This is a strange endeavor to the nonphilosopher. Lay people don’t need to question why
others comprehend what they say. They are understood
and understand others as well. To ask what they mean
by their language is a superfluous investigation. Why?
Because language hasn’t failed yet. Words seem so
organic that it is often difficult to step back and try to
understand how they work. A theory of meaning is not
necessary for words to work. Yet philosophy does
1
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search for such a system. The danger is that philosophy
will muddle a perfectly functional system.
The initial understanding of language is implied in the
philosophy of Descartes. Descartes views the mind as a
private place. The mind has thoughts that it conveys to
the world through language. I have a thought inside my
private mind which I then translate into language.
Words stand in for these private ideas, ideas to which
only the speaker has access. The outside world cannot
know my mind except through the language I use to
describe it. Language therefore gains meaning directly
from the Cartesian mind.
Wittgenstein offers a different understanding of
language and the self. He rejects the idea that language
could gain meaning from a private objects in the mind
of a speaker. He believes that language gains meaning
through public use in a community of speakers. The
classic example of this is Wittgenstein’s king piece on a
chessboard. To teach someone what a king is, we can
point to a king and say, “This is a king,” but she doesn’t
actually understand what the piece is until she
understands the use of the piece in the game. The game
metaphor is extended to language. As in a game, the
use of language must be rule guided. In order to
communicate with each other, we need to understand
the rules of communication. The rules of chess make
the game and define a use for the term “king.” When
we understand the rules, we are initiated and can play
chess ourselves. Language functions in the same way.
There are multiple language games, each with their own
context and rules of use. The rules of use are specific
to each game. Like games, language games are created
and die; they evolve until we have no use for them.
There are multiple language games, each specific to
their form.
As a result, for Wittgenstein, there can be no
private language that refers to objects accessible to the
36

speaker alone. In order to participate in a language
game I have to be familiar with rules. I learn rules
through socialization, because my community teaches
me the rules. Just as I learned to play gin rummy by my
family teaching the rules to me, my family also taught
me how to use words in different language games. I
was taught that the word believe in the sentence “I
believe in God,” was used differently then in the
sentence “I believe you.” I was initiated into the
language games of religion and trust. But the rules I
learned were contingent on my community. Correct
usage was determined by the community’s
understanding of the rules. Understanding this correct
usage is being initiated into the language game.
As in regular games, I cannot play a language
game when I do not know the rules. When I went to
play gin rummy at a friend’s house, I lost a hundred
points for holding the queen of spades at the end of a
hand. An alien rule to me, I was upset that I lost, and
from my perspective unfairly. We were playing two
different games, because the rules were different.
Language works the same way. The sentence “I believe
in God,” means something different to a Catholic than
to a Protestant. To understand the rules, we have to be
initiated.
Private language cannot determine meaning in
the manner Wittgenstein describes and others cannot be
initiated into a private language. The objects, the
thoughts of a Cartesian mind, are in an exclusive space
that others cannot enter.
As such we have an
epistemological privilege where our own minds are
concerned. Whatever seems to be the case is the case.
Because we individually determine the use of a private
language, there is no way we can be wrong. If
everything is in accordance with a rule, it is doubtful
we have a rule at all. In fact, not only do we not have a
rule but the language would be meaningless even for
37

the person whose language it is. Without a rule
following, no public consensus can be reached.
Without a rule, a word can have no regular use and
hence no meaning.
Language is used to make
connections between individuals and this requires that
we follow rules. Wittgenstein writes that "If language
is to be a means of communication there must be
agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this
may sound) in judgments." 2 To base a language game
on something the individual has exclusive access to, is a
failing language game. It cannot use language because,
“the individual words of this language are to refer to
what can only be known to the person speaking; to his
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot
understand the language.” 3 Meaning is lost. Private
language cannot follow public rules and cannot produce
meaning.
The concept of a self within this framework
shifts from Descartes self inside a private mind, to a
self that is public, constituted within language games
and the self becomes contingent. Each person is
familiar with her own set of language games. While
each person may have a unique combination of
language games, none of the language games within the
set is unique to that individual alone. There is no
private self, within this understanding of language.
Rather our experience is constituted through a public
language. Therefore the self is not an isolated private
mind, but rather the self is constituted by language
games. Richard Rorty argues that a self constituted by
language games is itself contingent, because if I change
my languages games I change myself. This also means
that selves cannot exist outside of language because
2
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language comprises the self. In this interpretation, a
private Cartesian self is nonsensical.
The experience of oppression is usually
perceived to be a private language. Only an individual
knows how she is oppressed and how it affects her.
The problem is that because no one else has access to
my mind, whatever seems to be the case is the case. As
far as my thoughts are concerned, my use of language
to describe my internal feelings is the only language
that can be used to describe them, and the distinction
between correct and incorrect rule following collapses.
This is not to say we should doubt a person when she
says she feels oppressed. Rather, Wittgenstein believes
this form of skepticism is embedded in a Cartesian
understanding of the mind. When I speak, I play a
language game that no one has been initiated into. I
define meaning. This is suspect foundation for a
language game, because language is not a private
activity.
We use language to make connections
between individuals. The problem is that oppression
takes the form of oppression of individuals. For
example, torture is not a common experience within a
community. The experience does not gain voice within
a community because it is not an experience that others
will share. Hence, no language can be developed to
speak about it.
However, there is hope within Wittgenstein’s
arguments if we apply a new political dimension with
Rorty and Alcoff. These views of language implicate
the philosophical relationship between language and the
self. The Cartesian sense of self means that only I can
accurately speak for myself, because my thoughts are in
a private space no one else can enter. It is not created
by speaking, but rather it simply exists as a stable entity.
This extends to the problem of speaking for others,
because only an oppressed group knows how they are
oppressed and how it affects them. The problem is that
39

because no one else outside the group has access to
their subjective state of oppression. The language they
may use to express it functions as a private language to
the rest of society. All specific language games
functions this way. However, the language game the
oppressed use to express their oppression is one that
necessarily needs to transcend its community to spur
change. But, no one but the oppressed can play it, and
therefore no outside connection can be made. It cannot
produce public meaning.
However, if language gains meaning from use,
then access to the private objects of the oppressed
group’s language game is not hopeless. There is no
longer a private self but only the public self. We,
including the oppressed, become our descriptions of
ourselves. Groups can fall into dominant language
games and descriptions, but in doing so we allow others
to define who we are. We must determine what is true
of and for ourselves. I conclude with Rorty that:
It was Nietzche who…suggested that we drop the
idea of “knowing the truth.”…He hope that once we
realized that Plato’s “true world” was just a fable,
we would seek consolation…in being that peculiar
sort of dying animal who, by describing himself in
his own terms, had created himself. More exactly,
he would have created the only part of himself that
mattered by constructing his own mind. To create
one’s mind is to create one’s own language…4

There is no privileged truth but rather truth is relative to
our adopted language games. Truth becomes not
objective Truth, but something that is agreed upon; it is
contingent.

4
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This brings us to the political issue. The
intuitive response is to do everything possible to allow
the oppressed to speak for themselves. This is not
always possible. But, if language constitutes the self,
then who can speak for the oppressed and how can she
do so? Alcoff’s understanding of speaking for others is
a good starting point.5 Her general argument is that the
location of the speaker affects the meaning and truth of
what is said. Moreover, the location of the speaker
affects the speech itself. Language is a creative activity
and what we create is contingent on where we are
located within society. Alcoff’s arguments can be added
to Rorty’s interpretation of the self. When we speak we
are not only creating new truth relative to the language
games we employ, but we create ourselves. Hooks uses
this idea of selves to create a political program for
oppressed groups. She extends the metaphor of
language as a game. If language is a game then it has
elements of competition and power, and even
playfulness. These elements can be used to make a
speech for others a speech to their advantage, but with a
few caveats. The first is that we initially resist the urge
to speak for others and listen to them. This ideally
allows the speaker to share agency with the oppressed
by including them in the creative process. Secondly,
we must account for our location and context when we
speak. President Bush’s analysis of Iraq is very
different from that of an Iraqi. Each should account for
the way their location affects his speech. Third, the
speaker must be responsible for her own speech.
Speaking on behalf of someone else doesn’t enable the
speaker to speak without thought. Finally, the speaker
must attempt to take account of the affects of the speech.
Ultimately, we must recognize that speaking and

5
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silence are always a political decision. We must use
our voice consciously.
If the self is located within language games the
there is a commonality between those who share
language games. This removes some of the barriers
between selves and I do have access to the experience
of those with whom I share language games. Sharing
language games means sharing experience. I am able to
speak for those who language games I play. There are
some problems with this understanding. Alcoff thinks
membership in a group is not precise or determinate. It
is unclear which groups I could belong to and which of
those groups I should single out to affiliate myself.
More importantly, membership in a group doesn’t
necessarily mean an authority to speak for the whole
group.
However, if we accept that the self is
constituted within language, then those who share
language games with me have direct access to my
experience in away that no one can ever have access to
a Cartesian mind. We do not need to ask for absolute
identity, language and experience between speakers but
just a commonality. Furthermore, Bernstein argues that
we cannot speak without speaking for other people.6
The speaker’s location is necessarily a location in
relation to other people. The relationship cannot be
removed, and we cannot avoid it. Speaking at all
makes speaking for others inevitable.
We return to the intuitive response to the
struggle of oppressed groups: have the group speak for
itself. Speaking becomes a type of agency in which I
construct myself because contrary to a Cartesian self,
selves do not exist prior to or separate from language.
To lose my speech is to lose myself. The oppressed
have the ability to communicate with each other and
through their language game they are able to discuss
6
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their struggle with one another. Sharing languages
games enables the oppressed to a specific, limited
dimension of power. Their language game will always
fail to communicate their struggle to those who have
not been initiated into it. They have direct access to the
experience of oppression and their agency, but they can
only reach their own group. Those on the margin
cannot reach those in the center. On the other hand,
those in the center, the elites, share a language that can
reach the majority of society. It is a language game
they are familiar with and can use adeptly. However,
they do not have the experience with or access to the
language game of the oppressed. They have the power
to use their language but nothing to say. The catch-22
is the choice between a group who embodies the agency
and the dimensions of political struggle against
oppression without a way to communicate it to the
larger community, and a group with the language to
reach society but is ignorant of the political struggle.
There lies a need for a synergy between the experience
of the oppressed on the margins and the language game
of those in the center.
The synergy requires a speaker who comes from
the oppressed but has knowledge of the language game
of the center. Such a person could incorporate the
experience of the oppressed into a new language game
that could be accessed by those in power. The concern
is what is lost and sacrificed in translation. If the
language games are so disparate that initiation in one,
offers no insight into the rules of the other, than there is
doubt that translation can be done at all. If translation
cannot be done, the best to be hoped for is cooption
forcing the margins into the mainstream.
What then is the solution? I agree with bell
hooks that the oppressed mist celebrate their position on
the margins. The oppressed should not try to move into
the center but appreciate their counterculture. The
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oppressed must produce intellectuals so that the
dominated can speak to the dominating. The idea goes
back to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the organic
intellectual.7 The elites are indoctrinated in the ruling
ideology and have an investment in the current order.
No matter how progressive their politics may be, the
elite will always be the elite. Their investment in the
current social order precludes offers of true systemic
change. Gramsci writes of the need for the working
class to develop its own intellectuals who are
organically tied to their class. This argument is similar
to hooks’ argument. The margin must produce organic
intellectuals. It might be thought that these organic
intellectuals should translate between language games.
But as hooks points out, using “the oppressor’s
language” is not adequate because it cannot articulate
the experience of the oppressed. Yet, it is the only
language game the oppressing can play. Organic
intellectuals affect the center from the margins if they
are able to incorporate multiple voices in the texts they
create.
The goal of the organic intellectual according to
hooks is to “identify the spaces where we begin a
process of revision” to create a counter-ideology. 8
Hooks relates this agency to language. “Language is
also a place of struggle.” 9 The counterculture can
produce a counter-language, which is able to produce a
new language to mediate between the margins and the
center.
Necessarily the new game must include
portions of both old language games or no one will
understand it. It must use old understandings to create
7
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new meanings. These counter-languages can function
as the intermediary language games that the oppressed
and the elites can be initiated simultaneously. A new
language game must be created.
A good example of this is Martin Luther King’s
“I Have a Dream” speech. He used concepts of
freedom and democracy familiar to the center to explain
the experience of the oppressed within in the
mainstream language game, as well as created new
metaphors and linguistic form, i.e. the preacher’s
sermon, to bring the voice of the oppressed and the
oppressors into a realm of communication. (bell hooks
uses the preachers sermon form in her refrain ‘language
is also a place of struggle’).10 One famous metaphor is
freedom as a bounced check to African Americans.
This created a new understanding of the situation. It
worked between the language of oppression understood
by African Americans and the center’s understanding of
freedom and the promises of democracy. King was
able to include multiple voices, building a bridge
between the margin and the center.
The conclusion of hooks is that the margin can
be more than a place of oppression and alienation. It
can be “a site of radical possibility, a space of
resistance,” that is not open to those in the center. It is
the space to produce counter-hegemonic culture that the
organic intellectual is looking for. The oppressed can
retell their story, and if we accept Rorty’s argument that
the self is contingent, the oppressed create themselves
in the process. To speak for the oppressed is to silence
them. Moreover, in their absence of voice, we define
them. We can define them in many ways, but they will
always be a “they” and not an “us.” They will be the
other. We must have faith in the margins to produce
new language games to communicate with us.
10
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